University of Missouri, St. Louis

IRL @ UMSL
UMSL Global
1-1-1980

Agricultural Land Evaluation in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe
Elizabeth Clayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/cis
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Clayton, Elizabeth, "Agricultural Land Evaluation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" (1980). UMSL
Global. 25.
Available at: https://irl.umsl.edu/cis/25

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in UMSL
Global by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.

·,

~

----------------Occasional Paper 8021
December, 1980

Oct~sional Papers
The Center for International Studies
of the University of Missouri-St~ Loui,
issues Occasional Pacers at irregular
int.ervals from ongoing research projects,
thereby providing a viable means for
communicating tentative results. Such
"informal" pub! ications reduce some\<1hat
the delay between research and publication, offering an opportunity for the
investigator to· obtain reactions .while
st i 11 engaged in ·che research. Corr.men ts·
on these papers, therefore, are particularly welcome. Occasi.onal P~pers should
not be reproduced .or quoted at length
without the cons·ent of the author or of
the Center for International Studies •

.E 1 i zabeth Clayton

Agricultura~ land Evaluation
in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe

Agricultural Land Evaluation
I

'

in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Eu rope

Elizabeth Clayton
Professor of Economics
University of Missouri - St. Louis

(314) 553-5554

Kenne_th Gray" Dal'.e Hoover, Alan Poul inquen, Everett Jacobs,
Philip Raup and ~arl-Eugen Wadekin contributed a number of
encouraging and :helpful comments on an earlier draft on th i's
paper. The work. for it was started under a Ford Foundation
grant on social i'st property rights, continued at the Kennan
Institute, and f:inally completed with a summer research grant
form the University of Missouri - St. Louis.

The recent consumer dilssatisfaction with food supplies in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe points out both the success and the failure of the 1ast two
. decades• agricultural polijies.

On the successful side, output has risen more

. I

than 40 percent between 1960 and 1978, with the highest success in Hungary,
where grain production gre~ by more than 80 pOrcent.1

On the other side,

f

these achievements took-pl~c:e only with rapidly rising costs, which increased

.

I

more than 50 percent during the same period.2

Thi's resulted in a familiar

price-cost squeeze and the socialist governments have subsidized agricultural
prices to cover costs.

Thu[s the consumers want more food than can be provided

only by increasing the sub,idies and their fiscal burden.
The politics during ec onomic development often give rise to this policy
1

dilemma, between increasind food subsidies or increasing food prices, which.

I

has been called a conflict lbetween the politics of distribution and the politics
of production.3
consumers:

The distrfibution politics mandate low food prices for urban

the production \politics, high wages as an incentive for farm workers~4

The agri cu 1tu ra 1 subsidies !accommodate both pol it i ca 1 groups but become
increasingly burdensom as o~tput increases, and they generate a search for lower
costs.

Anomalously, for

al

socialist economy, the search has Jed to the pricing

of agricultural land •
. One incentive for the examination of land value is the declining ratio of
arable land per capita, i:e[•• less land must feed more people.

In Poland, for

example, the arable land pelr person in 1970 was only 80 percent of its level in
1955.5

I

.

This does not mean[ that the land per agricultural worker also was falling,

for indeed it has risen in Eastern Europe becauserrewmechanical technology allows
a worker to farm more land; Poland is the only exception. 6

Another incentive for the study of socialist land value is the complex of
functions that a la~d price serves.

While a land price reflects land scarcity,

it serves other special purposes in a market economy.

First of all, it is an

asset value and a means of transfer or exchange of the asset.7

Largely for

Marxist reasons (often associated with the politics of distribution), social ism
abolished or diminished the asset•owriing class, truncated its wealth entitlements,
an.d 1 imited its earnings to those from labor.

Land ownership was nationalized only

in the Soviet Union~ but in the other East European countrjes the difference is
more nominal than real.a

Even in Poland, where the ownership of agricultural

land is ostensibly "private,."

a transfer is effectively limited to inheritance.

If there is no direct heir, the ownership reverts to the state.9
Nevertheless, a socialist ownership of agricultural land created an allocation problem that has been previously explored only for capitalism.
separated ownership from control.10
maker and replaced him with a planner.

It

It abolished the landowner as a decisionThe planner in socialist agriculture

faces complex choices involving the land, such as investment (and its financing),
an optimum farm size, and the allocation of land between uses:
and housing, between corn and cotton.

between cropland

A private owner would decideJw implicitly

maximizing land rent and his decision would be economically efficient because the
land would b.e allocated to its.highest valued use.11

The socialist owner has no

such easy criterion because the land rent was abolished with th~ land. price~ 12
The purpose of the current valuation schem'es is to restore the land rent, but
only for allocation decisions.

One step toward a socialist land price occurred with the recogn1tion that
land of higher quality creates a rent for its user, with the consequence that
equal farm workers may receive unequal incomes depending only on the quality of
the soil.

A scholar in the Ukraine has estimated that tbe difference in income

that was unrelated to work effort rose as high as 100 percent. 13

In resolving

this problem, the l~nd rent was not made explicit nor was it attached to the land,
but was deducted from the money prices paid to farmers for government purchases.
Prices were differentiated by procurement zones, a practice.of the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe~ 14

The land rent implicit in gross crop revenues is difficult

to ca·lculate exactly; too high a rent extraction inadvertently taxes labor effort
but too low rent creates a subsidy and distribution inequities.

Over time, the

number of prices and zones has proliferated and the differentials have become
greater. 15
Nonetheless, the zonal pricing of crops reflects the politics more of
distribution than of production.

It gives farmers income, but no new incentives

to use good land for a more valuable crop.

All land still seems free, so that

the price of the good land is the same as for all others.

More important in a

planned economy, the planner sees no dLfferences in land value either and freely
shifts productive farmland out of agriculture to factories, urban housing,
airports, and hydroelectric dams.

Soviet economists have estimated that irrational

use of land in the location of buildings loses one billion rubles annually, at
le~st

0.5 percent of the Net Material Product. 16

In fairness, this problem is

not only that the socialist planner is pro•in~ustry.

Since the good farmland

includes public investments (roads and such) that also are valuable in industry
and housfng, it often is converted to urban use in private markets when the less
ferti·le

land with new roads would have been equally useful

agricultural production as wel 1. 17

for housing and spared

Treating land as
factor of production.

11

free 11 fails to acknowledge its value and scarcity as a
The omission is by no means rare; e.g.; input-output

tables include only the factors of labor and capital.

The omission of land is

most misleading in the analysis of agriculture where land looms so large and
irreplaceable an input.

At the macroeconomic level, some prices have been

suggested to account for land's imputed share of income.

Abram Bergson, in

estimating the Soviet national income at factor cost, entered land at the same
share of farm earnings as the United States in 1946. 18

More recently, some

Soviet authors have calculated a similar number and their result is surprisingl~
close to that of Bergson.

Bergson. estimated that 32 percent of farm earnings ,

could be attributed to land in the Soviet Union; Onishchenko estimated that the
share in the Ukraine was 27 percent.19

These aggregate estimates are useful in

macroeconomic analysis, but do not assist at all the evaluations to be made at
the microeconomic level where land is allocated to a use.
Establishing a microeconomic ]and value is an extraordinary undertaking
because the number of uses and users (actual and potential) surely is infinite
and the characteristics that give value to the land are undoubtedly numerous.
un:derstandably, some simplifications were introduced.

In all of Eastern Europe,

the f1rst step was an inventory and a registration of land users and their holdi-ngs?O
Aerial surveys provided some considerable technical assistance in this processe
The urban and industrial zones were separated from the agricultural areas.
Or'.dinarily this work was directed by geographers and it is analogous to a land
ti:tle systemw-llere the ownership is private, as in any economic system

the

measurement and legal descriptior, of land is indispensable to agricultural
modernization and development. 21

The 1and reg.istration system was a part of a more extensive cadastra1
survey, which add a soi 1-cl imate ana1ysis and then an economic va1uation.22
The soil-climate taxonomy of agricultura1 zones is complex, as an example from

the Sovi~t cadastral survey will illustrate. 23

First, the agricultural land

is assigned to a "be 1t 11 based on tempera tu re and separated into co 1d,. temperate,
or warm.

Then it is assigned to 9ne of fourteen

11

zones 11 based on the balance of

temperatulre and water, and the prevai 1 ing soi I type, such. as the
zone.

11

forest steppe"

Frpm this are defined 44 "provinces, 11 with sub-zones based on microclimate
I

-

•

{e.g., fo(r early, middle,. or late maturing of crops) and sub-provinces based on
I

relief (l eve1, va~1ey, mountainous).
1

category.)

(Five mountainous

11

oblasts 11 are a separate

This taxonomy numbers about 350 categories and establishes the

agricultural zone-pricing scheme mentioned above, It is now more or less complete.
This complex taxonomy has been simplified and synthesized into technical
values measuued in units (ball), usually with a range of zero to 100 but

occas lonalll y with an open :::e.

Al though a cen tra I adm in Is trat ion instruction

imposes some common requirements, each administrat1v·a sllb-unit devises its own

qualitati~e scale and they vary wldely. 24

The ball measures oft~ are used in

research projects that require a land quality variable, e.g., in an analysis of
coijdit.ion~ for establishing an· fndustrial complex. 25

Thi~ complex qoaJitative

evaluatioj[ system (bonitirovka) is .neither recent nor socialist, but several
centuries old.

I Perhaps

Its antecedents are the land tax assessments of earlier empires. 26

because of these suspect antecedents, the bonitirovka measures have

not peen lsed as a land price in money terms.

The economic evaluation of

agri~ultJral land has relied little on thils vast technic"al study and the
I

I

,

cada~tral taxonomy but more on the variants of yield (output per hectare).

Using yield as an economic indicator requires troublesome decis:ions as to
11

which crop, 1111whose yield, 11 and nwhat price of crop. 11

While the administrators

again show considerable local option and diversity, most have choosen their
major crop to value their land:
grain for animals (an

11

food grain for people (a

11

wheat 11 unit) _or feed

oat 11 unit) •. Most use the yield of an. average producer

as a numeraire, but a few. have valued land by the yield of an experimental farm
or a hybrid seed producer.27

The price to value the yield (and to compare the

wheat land value with the oat) presents a difficult choice because all
agricultural prices reflect inversely the rent of the land that they are to value.
This circularity has· encouraged a number of proposals for alternate 1-ahd
values, and three schools of thought will show their diversity. 28

One school

would value land by its revenues per hectare, but this procedure draws the same
criticism as before, because the revenues depend on the zonal prices that extract
land rent.

A second school would value land inversely by its cost per hectare

for a given yield, with the j8stification that the land's value is its ability
to save other inputs, especially labor.

Since

11

cost"

in the Soviet economy has

several definitions, this measure has several complicated versions; there also is
disagreement as to whether land itself i.s a cost.

Finally, some propose that

·agricultural land should be valued by the cost of its replacement, as in the
• clearing of forest, the restoration

of open mines, and the 1 ike.

This last, the replace!11ent concept of agricultural la!'ld value, has the
virtues of simplicity and reason.

The idea was first proposed by G~ P•. Wibberley

for the United Kingdom and later migrated to Eastern Europe.29

Wibberley,

concerned about Britain's vanishing food supply as cities sprawled over the best
agricultural land, argued that the market and the city planners valued this land
inappropriately.

He proposed a new land value based on the concept of

replacement, 11 a simplified derived demand.

11

food

Food replacement, Wibberley argued, could come from several sources, each
giving a different value to the land lost to urban sprawl.

First, the land

itself could be replaced, and Wibberley calculated value from the cost of
reclaiming land from the sea, from forests, from abandoned mineral works (gravel
pits and open minesJ. The third school listed above uses such a measure for
valuing the land lost to large water projects.

These lands are all new to

agricultural production and at the extensive margin of production.

Wibberley

calculated as well the food replacement cost of the more .intensive use of
existing farmland by the addition of purchased inputs.

G:

Szabo has used such

a concept in his valuation of farmland in Hungary by fertilizer cost.30

Finally,

Wibberley calculated the food replacement cost of new producers on heretofore
uncounted land:
from abroad.

household production in domestic gardens and imported food

Corresponding equivalents from Eastern Europe have not been

published but surely exist implicitly.
In the broader context of the whole economy,_ agricultural land has value
not only for its. fertility and other natural characteristics ( 11 Ricardian 11 land
rent) but also for its location ( 11 von Thuenen" land rent).

Focusing only on

· the ferti 1 ity of individual farms omits the· locational rent, and the land prices
discussed above include none.

This omission is significant because location

value bften is half o1 land value in a market economy.3 1

A major reason is

the cost of transportation, and identical product from two loca.tions wi 11 differ
in net value at market when one requires lesstr,an~porithan the other.32

One

method bf valuing location is to attribute this difference in product value to
the location portion of. a land price.33

Although one Soviet study has drawn

this inference, it attributes the ~ifferential value to labor, not land, and
studies only a few farms.34

Location rent and Ricardian rent will coincide when people (reasonably)
locate themselves near the fertile land.35

Further, Martin Katzman has

shown that· the agricultural land near a population center is more fertile because more is invested in it.36

In part, this occurs because the land is

closer to th-e,:manufactured · inputs for farming that are made in urban factories.
Taken together, these imply that the location value of agricultural land is
correlated with the density of population.

In a simple test of this hypothesis,

a Soviet land value based on Ricardi an methods was correlated with population
density.37

The tw<it were
po.siti_vely ·c0r.r.el'ated
(-+;0.52) •.. When evaluated at-the
means,
•
I
.
•

they implied an elasticity of land value with respect to population density of
about" three.

Thus the omission of location rent from the land prices is not

serious as it appears.
Although agricultural land prices have been established in both the Soviet
Union and East Europe, they have been used primarily in East Europe.

The

primary use is to compensate farms for land withdrawn from production.
Probably the first actually to require payment for the land taken out of
agri.culture was the German Democratic Republic in January 1968.38
price then was 5000 marks per hectare (about 2.5 acres).

The average

It was discounted by

25 percent if the new user built roads or.other public facilities.

l.n Poland,

the average price of arable land is 15,000· zlotys with differentials for
fertility classes.39

Romania has no land prices but the government imposes a

"fine 11 of 5,000-50,000 lei (depending on land quality) if agricultural land is
diminished in quantity or quality.40

The Soviet Land Code (1968) established a

similar obligation to pay but I am told that it seldom is imposed. 41

Although

these price schemes influence the allocation of agricultural land between sectors,
they do not necessarily guid~ planning within agriculture~

Some Eastern European

countries have introduced a direct land rent for this purpose.

In the German Democratic Republic, the maximum land rent is 300 marks per
hectare per year; theminimumrrerttis actually a subsidy up to 150 marks per
hectareperyear. 42

In Poland, there is a land tax resembling a rent that

depends on soil fertility (6 classes) and land use.
countries charge only an indirect land rent.

Other East European

Czechoslovakia imposes an in-

come tax on production value that exceeds 1500 kroner per'hectare.
also imposes an income tax.

Bulgaria

The contribution to allocative efficiency of

these user charges is probablymlnus-cule since a choice of land use in
response to price often is not possible.
A decad_e ago, an American geographer wrote of the Soviet Union:
"Wanted·~

An Effective Land Use Policy ••• 11 43

This need remains indispendable

for expanding East Europe's food supply, and the agricultural land prices
were established to meet that need.

Their future and success are unknown.

The prices are artificial and rather like the shadow prices used for public
sector decisions in a market economy.

One. practitioner believes that

shadow prices cannot be implemented in a socialist economy because it has
no market to approximate, and his pessimism bodes ill for the future of these
prices. 44

The prices also seem so far to be more like a tax than an

allocative tool, in part because output plans cannot resp0nd to the land prices.
This is an empirical question that awaits testing.

The socialist scholars them-

selves dispute whether the constructed land values should be a part of the
farm's assets or ~imply a tool for planning.45

The prices weigh in the

politics of distribution but their weight in the politics of production is
unmeasured •.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1979,

1.

National Foreign Assessment Center, Handbook of Economic Statistics:
Washington D.C., 1979: 209, 51. -

2.

Gregor Lazarcik, "Comparative Growth and Levels of Agricultural Output and
Productivity in Eastern Europe," East European Economies Post Helsinki,
Joint Economic Committee, Washington O.C., 1977: 280-332.
Constance B. Krueger, 11 A Note on the Size of Subsidies on Soviet Government
Purchases of Agricultural Producers," ACES Bulletin, 16 (2), Fall 1974:
p; 63-72. William F~ Robinson (ed~)
·
The Strikes in Poland, Radio Free Eur6pe Research Munich, 1980: 32 ·

3.

Barbara Huddleston.and Jon Mclin, Political Investments in Food Production_,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1979_.

4.

In Romania an average collective farmer (full~itime) earns more than a worker
in manufacturing, A. Eme1 1 ian0v~ 11 Torzhestvo agrarnoi politiki bri?tskikh
sotsialisticheskikh-stram 11
Ekortomika Sel 1 skogo Khoziastva #4, 1979: p. 86.

5.

Harry Trend, Agriculture in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Survey, Radio Free
Europe Research, Munich, 1974. L. Brezhnev noted a similar problem in the
Soviet Union: see W.A.D. Jackson,. "Wanted: An Effective Land Use Policy
and Improved Reclamation" Slavic Review, 29 (3), September 1970: p. 411

6.

Ibid. See also, S. Maslennikov and V. Shkatov, "Plata za Prirodnye Resursy v
---rvrope i ski kh Sot is i a 1 i st i chesk i kh Stranakh, 11 Vop rosy Ekonom i k i , #8, 1974: p. 70

7.

The asset value of l~nd, its price, is the capitalized sum of land rents over
time. Land rent may bea residual paid to the land owner after the other
factors of production have been paid; or it may be a fixed payment to the
owner.

8.

F reder i c L. Pryor ,_P_ro_p._e_...rt_y.._a_n_d__
l n_d,...u_s_t,...r_i_a_l__O_r_9._a_n_i_z..,.a_t_i_o__n_i_n_C__o__
m.,.m_u_n_i....
s_t_an_d_
Capitalist Nations,
Indiana: University Press, Bloomington, 1973:
Chapter 2 •.

9.

The principle used here is that the restrictions on private ownership can reduce
land value, perhaps to zerc when it escheats to state-ownership. All
economies impose some land use restrictions (e.g., zoning., restrictive
covenants, and emTnent domain), so that ownership 1 ies more on a continuum
rather than in the binary categories of 11 private 11 or 11 publ ic. 11 Although the
agricultural sector in Poland usually is classified as 11 private, 11 the
restrictions placed on its land (see the Christian Science Monitor, April 23,
1980) move it closer to the 11 public 11 end of the ownership continuum.

10. Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Cor oration and
Harcourt Brace, New York, 196; first published 1932.

11.

The allocation may maximize utility, rather than profit, e.g., when it is used as
a deer park or hunting preserve.

12.

The land rent is a flow and a payment for the services of land (see also footnote
7). For example of this concept in the context of public forest management in
the United States, see William Hyde, Timber Su l
Land AILocation and Economic
Efficiency, Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press, 19 0:
•7o

13.

A.M. Onishchenko, Ekonomicheskie roblem is ol'zovaniia zeme1 1 n kh i vodn kh
rt:;sursov v se1 1 skom khoziaistve,_Nauka Dumka; Kiev, 197: Parts 111 1 IV

14.

Morris Bornstein, "Soviet Price Policy in the 1970's, 11 Soviet Economy in a Ne.w
Perspective, Joint Economic Committee, Washington D.C., 1976: p. 34-46, and
"Economic Reform in Eastern Europe, 11 East European Economies Post Helsinki,
Joint Economic Commit tee, Washington D. c., 1977: Part 11 I. Kar I-Eugen
Wadekin in correspondence has noted that in East Europe the policies of tax
abatement an.d production subsidies are used more widely tha'n zonal price
concessions to support the marginal farms.

15 •

Born s t e i n , op • c i t.

16.

J. Wilczynski, "Towards Rationality in Land Economics Under Central Planning, 11
The Economic Journal (September 1969): p. 543 ·

17.

G.P. Wibberley, Agriculture and Urban G.rowth: A Study of the Competi,tion for
Rural Land, M. Joseph, London, 1959. I am indebted to Phi I ip Raup for this
reference.and for directing me to the ·migration of its ideas through
East Europe ..

18.

Abram Bergson, The Real National 1.ncome of Soviet Russia Since 1928.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1961: p. 138-9.

19.

On i shchenko:

20.

Bela Sarfalvi, ed., Land Utilization in Eastern Europe. Akademial Kiado, Budapest,
1967 describes this stage in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Un1on.

21.

Peter Dorner, 11 Land Ownership and Tenure,11 E.R. Duncan, ed • . Dimensions of World
Food Problems, Iowa State University Press, Ames, 1977; p. 90-104.

22.

Kenneth Gray, 11 Soviet Agricultural Prices, Rent and Land Cadastres, 11 Journal of
Comparative Economics, 4(4), December 1980, forthcoming.

23.

V.V. Egorov et al, Prirodno-sel 'skokhoziaistvennoe rainoirovanie zemel'nogo fonda
~ , Kolos, Moscow, 1975. I .V. Degtiarev, Zemel 'nyi kadastr, Kolos, Moscow,
1979. O. K. Zamkov and G.I. Valeshko, 11 0tsenka Zemel' po osnovym zem.ledel'cheskim
zonam i raionam SSSR 11 Voprosy Geograf ii, Sb. 99, 1975: p. 41-63.

p. 186.

24 •. G.S. Nikolenko, Ekonomicheskaia otsenka zemli, Gosizdat, Alma-Ata, 1964: p. 51
shows a comparison illustrating this point. A more complete listing can be
found in A.G. Medvedev, L.N. Surovyi, G.M. Okrut, V.S. Zhmako, Kachestvennaia
otsenka zemel I v kolkhozakh i sovkhozakh ~ , lzdat Urozhai, Minsk, 1971: 55 ff.

25.

A. Sviatogor and V. Petkevich, 11 Ekonomicheskaia otsenka vozmozhnostei khoziaistvy
pri provedenii industria1izatsii 11 Ekonomika Sel 1 skogo Khoziaistva, #7, 1980:

p. 32-34.
26.

F.N. Kolotinskaia, Pravovye osnovy zemel 1 nogo kadastra v Rossii, lzdat Moskovskogo
Universiteta, Moscow, 1968 provides a history of land valuation and
registration, including the Caucasus and Central Asia, where water supplies
entered the calculations. A brief overview is available in 110tsenka Zemli, 11
and "Kadastr Zemel 1 nyi 11 Sel 'skokhoziaistvennaia Entsiklopedi ia, Moscow, 1971
T. 4, p. 678 and T. 2, p. 983 respectively. G. Szabo, 11 The Problems of the
Economic Valuation of Land Withdrawn from Agricultural Cultivation in the Works
of Hungarian Economists, 11 Acta.Oeconomica, 7(3-4), 1971 (esp. p. 401) discusses
inter alia the cadastral land value in the Austro-Hungarian empire. In
correspondence, Karl-Eugen Wadekin has said that similar systems prevailed in
Poland, Germany, and other East European countr.ies.

27.

A. Kazanskii and P. Beloborodov, 11 Ekonomicheskaia Otsenka zemli: Obzor literatury, 11
Ekonomika Sel 1 skogo Khoziaistva, #1, 1969: 114-118 reviews this and other
differences.

28.

Ibid.

29.

Wibberley, op. cit. See also the review of G. Szabo 1 s book on economic valuation
of land in Acta Oeconomica, 15, 1975: p. 262-4.

30.

G. Szabo, "The Problems of the Economic Valuation of Land Withdrawn from
Agricultural Cultivation in the Works of Hungarian Economists, 11
Acta Oeconomica, 7 (3-4). 1971: p. 399-408.

31.

Martin Katzman, "The von Thunen Paradigm, the Industrial-urban Hypothesis and the
Spatial Structure of Agriculture, 11 American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
56, 1974: p •. 683-696. · J. Taurianinen and F.W. Young, 11 The Impact of Urban
Industrial Development on Agricuftural

Incomes and Productivity in Finland 1 11

Land Economics, 52, 1976: 192-203. Richard Muth" Economic Change and RuralUrban Land Convers i ans, 11 Econometrica, 29 (January 1961); p. 1-22.
Vernon W. Ruttan, 11 The: Impact-of· Loca.1 Population Pressu·re on Farm Real Estate
Values in California',' Land Economics and Giannini Foundation Paper #204.

32.

In location analysis, this relationship yields the "rent-distance 0 gradient
that show the maximum land rent that a user will 'pay, or must earn.

33.

Edgar M. Hoover, An Introduction to Regional Economics, Knopf, New York, 1971,

113-4
34.

Yu. Tokmakov, "Mestopolozhenie kolkhozov i transportnye izderzhki, 11 Ekonomika Sel
skogo khoziaistva, #9, 1977: 48-52. This article is a case study of
transport costs for five kolkhozy. However, the relation to land value is
seen only through the agricultural pricing system, that includes tariffs for'
transport.

35.

Kenneth Gray made this cogent observation in his response to an earlier draft of
this paper.

36.

Op. cit.

1

:;,

37. Ricardi an prices: M.N. Loiter, ...P...r...i""."ro~d~n..,y"'e;,,,..;r~ei-!s_u~r..s.y__.....,e_f_fe_k_t_i_v_n_o_s_t_1__k_a._p..,i_ta......1...1 n_.y_k_h
vlozhen ii, rzdat Nauka, Moscow, 1974:
Population density:

162-3.

Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1975 g.

38.

Maslennikov and Shkatov, op. cit., footnote 8.

39.

Wilczynski, op. cit.

40.

Mas]ennikov and Shkatov, op. cit., footnote 8.

41.

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, January 21, J969, 12•20, translates the
original that.appeared on December 14, 1968 in Pravda and lzvestiia.

42.

In 1973, the land rent was subsumed in a more comprehensive tax system.

43.

Jackson, op. cit., p.

44.

J. Margolis,

45.

Maslennikov and Shkatov, op. cit.

411

Shadow Prices for Incorrect or Nonexistent Market Values, 11 Pub] ic
Ex~enditure and Policy Analysis Rand McNally (2nd edition),_ New York, 1977:
20 -220.
11

